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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ECONOMICS OF INSECURE SOFTWARE

Last year the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) demanded that
Microsoft improve the security on its Passport information service, or face
stiff fines up to eleven thousand dollars per violation.) Based on the fact
* J.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School, 2004; Msc Information Systems, London School
of Economics, 2000. Special thanks to Victor Goldberg, John Dunagan, and Tugba Colpan for their
editorial suggestions and assistance. I would also like to acknowledge the generous financial
support for this work provided by the Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy Law & Economics
Fellowship.
1. This FTC warning was the impetus for Microsoft's $ 100 million security initiative, called
Trustworthy and Secure Computing, which was supposed to lead to changes in development
throughout the company. See Ashlee Vance, $2 Trillion Finefor Microsoft Security Snafu?, THE
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that information for 200 million users is stored in Passport, Microsoft faces
fines that could total up to $2.2 trillion for a security flaw discovered in
May 2003 that would allow an attacker to access a Passport account at
will. 2 Interestingly enough, the flaw was not discovered by automated
scanning, or detailed analysis by a group of researchers. Rather, it took a
single security specialist less than four minutes to discover and exploit the
weakness. Most would view this story as yet another indictment of
Microsoft, but what is most disturbing about this episode is just how
unremarkable it is, and how easily it could have happened to almost any
of the major software manufacturers. Almost all software is riddled with
holes, and programs are released to purchasers with hundreds, if not
thousands, of security-related weaknesses.' This Article is an exploration
of this phenomenon, an attempt to understand just how undesirable
insecure software is, and to articulate those forces which are responsible
for this situation.
In undertaking this task, this Article will adopt a distinctly law and
economics perspective. This approach is warranted given the nature of the
relationship at the core of the issue, namely the interaction between
software seller and software buyer; but perhaps more important is the
framework that economics provides for locating what is the ideal amount
of software security. Economically speaking, security expenditure has long
been recognized as a dead weight loss, as it represents a transfer of
productive resources towards the empty activity of protection.' Security is
not a product that has usefulness in of itself, as its social benefit derives
only from its ability to reduce the welfare losses from theft and vandalism.'
REGISTER, May 8, 2003; see Robert Lemos, One Year On, is Microsoft Trustworthy?, CNET

News.com (Jan. 16,2003), availableat http://news.com.com/2100-1001-981015.html (last visited
Oct. 29, 2003) (discussing "trustworthy and secure computing" and the changes created by the
program).
2. See Vance, supra note I.
3. Id.
4. See Bruce Schneier, Forewordto JOHN VIEGA & GARY MCGRAW, BUILDING SECURE
SOFTWARE: How TO AVOID SECURITY PROBLEMS THE RIGrr WAY, at xix (2002) ("the average
large software application ships with hundreds, if not thousands, of security related
vulnerabilities").
5. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON.
J. 224, 231 (1967); Fred S. McChesney, Boxed in: Economists and Benefits from Crime, 13 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 225, 228 (1993).
6. Just what the costs of theft are is more complicated than it may initially seem. A
significant portion of the perceived loss from theft is simply a transfer of wealth, with no net loss
in social welfare. With this being the case society may be investing scarce resources in preventing
a transfer of wealth, which would represent a dead weight loss. See Richard L. Hasen & Richard
H. McAdams, The SurprisinglyComplex CaseAgainst Theft, 17 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 367, 369
(1997); Tullock, supra note 5, at 23; McChesney, supra note 5, at 228. This is not as problematic
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Consequently, the social utility of an extra unit of security must be based
on it preventing a more significant loss from crime; with an equilibrium
point where an extra unit is equivalent to the welfare loss that would be
prevented by that unit. Also, it seems fairly evident that security in the
context of computer crime is not a homogenous good, and these varying
types of security products have different levels of effectiveness. One would
also expect that there would be diminishing marginal utility from the
employment of any one type of security product, and that a bundle would
be the optimal way to achieve security equilibrium. Based on this
framework it would seem that the question of whether the amount spent on
security is efficient would be primary, but given the near impossibility of
calculating the total amount lost to security incidents, the focus should be
on the issue of whether the current allocation of resources includes an
efficient mix of security-related products.7
In the context of computer crime this mix will include some
combination of three approaches: engineer applications to have fewer
security holes, produce patches as security holes are discovered, and
implement security countermeasures to guard against attacks on a more
general level. As vividly demonstrated by the example of the cracking of
Microsoft's Passport information system, the current mix favors the last
two at the expense of application security. Part II of this Article describes
the three types of security, and establishes why application security should
be a higher priority. Part III lays out the conventional arguments for why
software security is not more of a priority, and explains why they do not
sufficiently account for this situation. Part IV puts forth an alternative
explanation, that there is a systemic market failure because information
about the safety level of software is largely unattainable. Since consumers
have no ability to determine if the product they are buying is vulnerable,
they cannot appropriately factor security into their buying decisions and
companies have no incentive to produce secure software. Finally, Part V
suggests some areas of analysis that could prove important for later
attempts to define how this market failure might be rectified.
for defining what the equilibrium point is for computer crime as it would be for other types of
crime. This is due to the fact that a large proportion of computer crime inflicts a loss with no
accompanying gain in utility for the attacker, as in the case of nuisance attacks. See Reid Skibell,
Cyber-Crimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 8
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909 (2003). For this reason, and to focus the analysis of this Article, the
welfare losses from theft will be treated as equivalent to the total losses from computer crime.
7. To further concentrate the analysis, this Article will confine itself to the issue of corporate
computer crime, and the security challenges faced by businesses attempting to combat computer
crime. Also, while the issue of insecure software is international, this Article focuses on how the
situation has developed in the United States.
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II. THE BUNDLE OF SECURITY MEASURES

A. Application Security
Software programs are incredibly dense complex configurations of
data, and this essential essence of software makes some level of bugs
inevitable. However, complexity does not account for the large number of
security-related weaknesses found in most software applications. The real
cause is a lack of emphasis on software security.9 This lack of a concern
for application security is underscored by the spending patterns of software
producers. For the year 2001, they spent more than $8.4 billion on
application design and construction tools, while total spending on
application security tools, training, and consulting was less than $50
million.'0
One argument raised by manufacturers about the presence of so many
holes is that they are not determinative of whether a system is at risk. They
contend that the skills of computer intruders are advanced and that if
sufficiently dedicated, they will be able to break the security on a system,
or find a way to launch a virus. For example, in Congressional testimony
in the wake of the devastating SQL Slammer virus, Microsoft's Susan
Kelley Koeppen took the position that:
These attacks did not occur because the extremely innovative engineers
creating the underlying codes disregarded security. They occurred because
equally innovative criminal hackers worked day after day to find, create
and exploit vulnerabilities in the software or in human nature that gave
them new ways to trespass on your computers, steal your data and shut
down your networks."
This explanation brings computer security conceptually close to physical
security, in the sense that while there may be ways to protect one's home
from an intruder, a burglar will almost always find a way to break in. In the
8. See FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH: ESSAYS ON SOFTWARE
ENGINEERING 183-84 (1995).
9. The preference of software manufacturers for issuing patching over creating secure
software will be more fully fleshed out in the section specifically devoted to patching.
10. Abner Germanow et al., The Injustice of Insecure Software, @Stake Research Report,
3 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.atstake.com/research/reportsacrobat/atstake injustice.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5,2003); Telephone Interview with Bruce Schneier, CTO of Counterpane Internet
Security (Apr. 8, 2003).
11. Cyber-SecurityEnhancementAct:Hearingon H.R. 3482 Before the Subcomm. on Crime
of the House Comm. On the Judiciary,107th Cong. 8 (2002) (Testimony of Susan Kelly Koeppen,
Corporate Attorney, Microsoft Corporation); Telephone Interview with Harris Miller, President
Information Technology Association of America (Apr. 17, 2003) (arguing that skilled hackers are
the cause of computer crime).
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world of physical security the response is to use significant criminal
sanctions and a criminal justice infrastructure, both to deter and apprehend
those who would transgress the law. However, the industry position is not
supported by the data on computer attacks, which demonstrates that the
majority of intrusions can be traced to those with very limited computer
skills. 2 These intruders, labeled script-kiddies in computer crime jargon,
download standardized tools from the Internet, which they use to exploit
common software security holes. 3 This is not to say that there are not
skilled malevolent hackers who are breaking into systems, or designing
these standardized tools, but the fact remains that holes being exploited by
generic tools are a primary source of losses from computer crime.
There is also reason to believe that application security could be useful
against other categories of computer criminals. Security specialists contend
that the key ingredient in protecting one's system is not the quality of the
intrusion-detection system, fire wall, or encryption protocol; rather, it is
whether or not the underlying application software is secure. 4 This is true
both in the sense that application holes are the primary avenue through
which attackers gain access to a system, and that software is the key
determinant of just how much damage will be done. 5 One estimate
concluded that design flaws in commercial and custom software composed
thirty to fifty percent of the total risks to IT infrastructure.' 6 Furthermore,
highly secure applications were found in practice to reduce overall
12. See Reid Skibell, The Myth ofthe Computer Hacker,5.3 INFO. COMM. & SoC'Y 336,343
(2002) (explaining that the majority of computer crime is undertaken by unskilled attackers, or
corporate insiders); see Richard Barber, Hackers Profiled- Who are They and What are Their
Motivations?,COMPUTER FRAUD & SECuRnY, Feb. 2001, at 14-17 (delineating unskilled scriptkiddies); Editorial, Hackers, Crackers and Phreakers Oh My!, COMPUTER FRAUD & SECURITY,

Apr. 1999, at 18 (showing script-kiddies make very common programming mistakes with
regularity), availableathttp://www.shockwavewriters.com/Articles/SWW/hcpom.htm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2003); Duncan Graham Rowe, Access Granted,NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 12, 2000, at 42
("They've [script-kiddies] no idea what they're doing. They download programs or scripts and hack
by pointing and clicking.").
13. See Skibell, supra note 12, at 343. While this is generally true, it must also be admitted
that attacks designed by more sophisticated users can also cause widespread damage. For example,
the SQL Slammer worm was not due to script-kiddies, and it may be that all the script-kiddie
attacks of 2002 added up were less costly than the effects of recovering from Slammer.
14. See Matthew Levine, The Importance ofApplicationSecurity, @Stake Research Report,
1 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.atstake.com/research/reports/acrobat/atstake_application_
security.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003); BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURrrY
INA NETWORKED WORLD 189 (2000) (explaining that the quality of the software is the key factor

of whether a system is at risk); John Viega & Gary McGraw, Risky Business, SD MAG., Mar. i,
2003 (showing software is the root cause of all major security incidents).
15. Schneier, supra note 10.
16. Germanow et al., supra note 10, at I.
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business security risk by eighty percent. 1 Plainly, quality software is an
important aspect of a network security scheme, no matter the source of the
attack.
The other argument alleged against improving application security is
the substantial nature of the costs involved. To make a significant
difference in the number of security holes in software, manufacturers
would have to make sizeable investments in security that would be passed
onto the consumer in the form of higher prices.' 8 The size of the costs
involved is evident in the current disparity between spending on
functionality tools versus security tools, but higher costs are not of
themselves an efficiency loss. Instead, the potential for waste is based on
the fact that only five to ten percent of software holes released into the
market are discovered, and improving the security of applications might
involve correcting holes that might never become an issue. 9 To what
extent this is wasteful is largely dependent on how easy it is to project
which holes are most likely to be discovered. The evidence on this issue
is mixed. Some scanning for security holes can be automated, but to a large
degree it is labor intensive and holes are extremely difficult to locate.20 In
spite of this, there are general areas of weakness and categories of attacks,
and if security is designed into software from the beginning, this can make
a serious difference with a relatively small investment of resources. 2' For
example, the reason that Passport was hacked so quickly was that the tester
was familiar with security principles and common Microsoft weaknesses,
and thus knew where to look. The implication is that some of the most
problematic security concerns are eminently foreseeable and may not have
even been that difficult to fix. There has been very little research on this
issue, but a study by Andrew Jacquith found that seventy percent of
security weaknesses resulted from design flaws that could have been
anticipated by a greater emphasis on security.2 2 Specifically, he concludes:
"What is most surprising about the defects was ...the degree to which
they were entirely preventable. Armed with the right skills and tools, we
believe that the companies in our survey could have readily detected and
17. Id. at 2.
18. Telephone Interview with Mario Correa, Director of Internet and Network Security,
Business Software Alliance (Mar. 12, 2003); Miller supra note 11.
19. Bruce Schneier, Will We Ever Learn?, INFO. SECURrrY, (Apr. 2000) ("It's much cheaper
to release buggy software and fix the 5 to 10 percent of bugs people find and complain about.").
20. Schneier, supranote 10.
21. See JOHN VIEGA & GARY McGRAW, BUILD NG SECURE SoFrwARE: How TO AvoiD
SEcuRtrrY PROBLEMS THE RIGHT WAY 23 (2002).
22. Andrew Jaquith, The Security of Applications: Not All are Created Equal, @Stake
Research Report, 1 (Feb. 2002).
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fixed the defects we found during the design phase."23 Jaquith argues that
what made the most difference between the low-performing and highperforming software was the quality of the security practices integrated
into the development.24 The efficiency of a more holistic approach is really
not very surprising, particularly in comparison to how security is handled
in many development situations. Often, a design team will be solely
preoccupied with getting an application to work, and the holes that
interfere with functionality are their primary concern. Security holes are
often addressed at the end of the process, and the effort expended on them
is proportional to the immediacy of the deadline.25
There is also reason to believe that the increase in cost could be offset,
to a degree, by less of a need to invest in security-specific applications.
Viega and McGraw argue that there is a direct correlation between poor
application security and spending on fire walls, intrusion-detection
systems, and other types of defensive precautions.26 The nature of software
security is such that it is only as strong as its weakest link, so one
vulnerable piece of software can necessitate substantial investments on the
part of the consumer to counter the risk.2 7 The value of this reduction of
spending on security countermeasures would be compounded by the fact
that the marginal utility of an additional unit is close to zero, so the cost of
a producer upgrading their software could be diffused over a wide number
of consumers. Essentially, there is a choice between a manufacturer
upgrading the security of its one product, with each consumer reaping the
benefits in terms of security, or the consumers each independently
spending on upgrading their security.
B. Penetrateand Patch
While each software manufacturer might have a slightly different
approach, the dominant paradigm is what has been loosely termed
23. Seeid. at4.
24. See id. at 5 ("the difference between the top- and bottom-quartile performers is due to
superior practices in designing, coding, and deploying secure applications"; see also VIEGA &
MCGRAW, supra note 21, at 38 ("good software engineering practice is crucial to building secure
software").
25. See Schneier, supranote 10.
26. See Viega & McGraw, supra note 14 ("We wouldn't have to spend so much time, money
and effort on network security if software security weren't so shaky."); SCHNEIER, supra note 14,
at 280 ("strong protection mechanisms mean that you don't need good detection and reaction
mechanisms").
27. See COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD (CTSB), CYBERSECURiTY
TODAY AND TOMORROW: PAY Now OR PAY LATER 7 (2002) ("Weaknesses in any of these aspects
can be very damaging, since competent attackers seek out weak points in the security of a network
or system."); ViEGA & MCGRAW, supra note 21, at 2.
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"penetrate and patch."2 Under this model, software is released into the
market, and once a weakness is discovered a patch is designed and issued
to contain the risk.29 This means that purchasers will be susceptible to
attacks during an interim period, termed the "window of vulnerability,"
between when attackers start exploiting the vulnerability, and when
manufacturers have become sufficiently aware of it to develop a patch.3"
Penetrate and patch is predicated on the idea that a security weakness is
only problematic in context, and the danger presented by initial discovery
is acceptably low. This danger grows as information about the hole
spreads, but is still relatively localized until some enterprising hacker
decides to automate it, making it available to the much larger network of
script-kiddies who are not sufficiently adept to use anything but an
automated tool. 3 1 Penetrate and patch will thus be most efficient when
patches are designed and issued prior to this automation, and the industry
purposefully attempts to slow this diffusion process, going so far as to push
for criminal prosecution for those who would intentionally post such
information. 32 They base this position on the argument that the most
against exploitation of a software weakness is
effective defense
33
anonymity.
The available evidence suggests that there are serious technical
problems when relying on patches to fix software problems. Often, the
weaknesses that patches are supposed to address are embedded within the
28. See Rebecca T. Mercuri, ComputerSecurity: Quality Rather than Quantity, 45 CoMM.
ACM 11, 12 (2002); Jaquith, supra note 22, at 3 ("many companies treat security as a 'penetrate
and patch' activity typically done after an application is deployed, rather than employing secure
software engineering practices"); VIEGA & MCGRAw, supra note 21, at 15 ("Many well-known
software vendors don't yet understand that security is not an add-on feature").
29. One study described the basic nature of penetrate and patch with a descriptive analogy:
The practice is "akin to an automotive manufacturer ensuring quality by banging out the dings with
rubber mallets at the end of the assembly line - or worse, after receiving customer complaints rather than designing a better manufacturing process from the beginning." Jaquith, supranote 22
at 3.
30. See William A. Arbaugh, William L. Fithen, & John McHugh, Windows of Vulnerability:
A Case-Study Analysis, IEEE COMPUTER 52, 54-56 (2000); Bruce Schneier, Closing the Window
of Exposure: Reflections on the Future of Security, SECURITy Focus, Sept. 18, 2000, availableat
http://www.securityfocus.com/guest/3384 (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
31. Arbaugh, Fithen, and McHugh describe a software hole as having a life cycle, which
commences with its being discovered and ends with installation of a patch. During the early stages
the vulnerability curve is increased, until the vulnerability is automated, and the vulnerability curve
begins decreasing with the issuance of the patch. Arbaugh, Fithen, & McHugh, supra note 30, at
52. Schneier uses the same descriptive framework. Schneier, supra note 30.
32. See Jennifer Granick, Comments to the US.Sentencing Commission 7-8 (Feb. 19,2003),
availableat www.eff.org/Legislation/CFAA/20030317_comments.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
33. Miller, supra note 11; Scott Culp, It's Time to End InformationAnarchy, MICROSOFT
SECURITY ESSAYS, (Oct. 2001).
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very structure of the code, and they are not always capable of correcting
the weakness. This problem is so pronounced that one leading researcher
claims that the "effectiveness of patches is somewhere between band-aids
and a stiff drink. 34 For example, both the Windows 9x platform (Windows
95/98/ME) and UNIX were not designed with security in mind, and these
systems have needed substantial security retrofitting that has not been
entirely successful. This is particularly true of Windows 9x, which is still
so vulnerable that a knowledgeable hacker should be able to crash or hijack
one with relatively little difficulty. 35 The other problem with patching is
that by continually applying makeshift code, the cohesion of the original
program starts to denigrate, and a patch can often create as many problems
as it fixes.36 Consequently, while patches may be a necessary component
to software security, they are still a stopgap measure which should not be
overly relied upon.
Beyond the technical problems associated with patches, there is the
issue of whether it is really possible to shrink the window of vulnerability
by suppressing information about security holes. There is some validity to
the industry argument that it is the publication of information on holes that
is responsible for them being so widely exploited. Studies have shown that
there is an upswing in intrusions using a given security weakness once it
has been publicly disclosed.37 However, it is probably unrealistic to expect
that information on security weaknesses is not going to find its way out
into the open, or be passed along to those who would exploit such
information.3" Also, it may be impossible to separate publication of
security holes from the general framework of penetrate and patch. Some
commentators have suggested that it is the negative publicity associated
with public disclosure, or the fear of such publicity, that motivates vendors
to release patches. Without this incentive, software vendors would be
extremely slow to spend the resources designing patches, if they did so at
all.39
34. Germanow et al., supra note 10, at 5.
35. See VIEGA & MCGRAW, supra note 21, at 37.
36. See Mercuri, supra note 28, at I I ("eventually the resulting patchwork quilt of [patches]
becomes unmaintainable").
37. Arbaugh, Fithen, & McHugh, supra note 30, at 52.
38. See Eben Moglen, Free Software Matters: Security Through Freedom (June 15, 2002),
available at http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/lu-2l.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2003)
(arguing that information on holes will inevitably be shared); Bruce Schneier, Managed Security
Monitoring: Closing the Window ofExposure (2000), available at http://www.counterpane.com/
window.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
39. See VIEGA & McGRAw, supra note 2 1, at 15-16 ("[software vendors] start to worry about
security only after their product has been publicly (and often spectacularly) broken by someone.").
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Even if anonymity could successfully function to slow down awareness
of security weaknesses, there are reasons to doubt that the penetrate and
patch approach can function effectively. While the industry has grown
better at releasing patches in a timely manner, there are still noticeable
examples of long lag times.40 In other instances, manufacturers have
decided that developing a patch is prohibitively expensive, so the user is
left with no easy way to repair the hole.4 Furthermore, even after a patch
is released many corporations are slow in updating their software. William
Arbaugh found that, "many systems remain vulnerable to security flaws
months or even years after corrections become available. 42 This problem
may be reduced by the advent of automatic updating features, such as the
one included in Windows XP.43 However, there is still a lot of resistance
to automatic updating, especially by corporations, because it necessitates
a high degree of system access be ceded to an external company.44
Furthermore, recent research indicates that it is not a simple
implementation failure by network administrators to timely update their
software. Companies are faced with resource constraints that make
constant software updating difficult, and they have concerns that patches
will create new functionality problems which will destabilize their
networks and production systems.45

40. For example, Microsoft was informed of a major security weakness in Windows XP but
took more than two months to release a patch that could have been available within two weeks. See
Richard Forno, Who Needs Hackers When We Have MS, THE REGISTER, Dec. 12, 2001. In another
case, a known weakness in Microsoft IIS was left unpatched for a year and a half, allowing the theft
of credit card information. See Schneier, supra note 38.
41. A recent example is provided by a flaw in Microsoft's Endpoint Mapper, which affects
its various Microsoft operating systems. A patch was devised for Windows 2000 and Windows XP,
but Microsoft admitted that it would be too costly to create a patch for Windows NT. The
company's rationale was that the flaw would allow an attacker to crash the system but not gain
access, and thus a patch was not critical. See John Leyden, NT 4. 0 Too Flawed to Fix - Official,
THE REGISTER, Mar. 27, 2003; see also Bruce Schneier, Three Minutes with Security Expert Bruce
Schneier, PCWoRLD, Sept. 28, 2001 ("If it's an easy fix, they'll fix it quickly and announce how
good they are. If it's a hard fix, they'll tell you it's not a problem.").
42. Arbaugh, Fithen, & McHugh, supra note 30, at 52, 58.
43. Telephone Interview with John Dunagan, Microsoft Research (Apr. 11, 2003).
44. Correa, supra note 18 (explaining the fear of giving vendors the kind of access necessary
to make automatic updating work).
45. Most security flaws do not affect functionality or reliability, and companies may have
concerns that patches will interfere with their systems in a more short term and concrete manner.
See Register Editorial, To Patch or Not to Patch, THE REGISTER, Apr. 5, 2003 (discussing the
inconvenience of constant patching); see Tiffany Kary, Security's Big Picture: Trust in Web
Services?, ZDNET, Nov. 27, 2002 (quoting Bruce Schneier, "If I was a sys admin I would have to
do one every day of the week. And you know [patches] always break stuff").
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C. Security Countermeasures
The penetrate and patch approach is complemented by the development
of more general "reactive" tools like fire walls, cryptography, detection
programs, and other add-ons that are intended to protect a system from a
wide variety of security weaknesses.4 6 There is no denying that these
security-specific applications work, and should be an aspect of prudent
organizational security. Fire walls, in particular, are useful in limiting
access to the network, and in confining attackers to parts of the network
that do not contain vital information.4 7 Encryption can also be a very
powerful force in protecting systems by protecting packets in transit from
interception." Similar to patching, an argument can be made that these
measures are so effective that they should be emphasized at the expense of
application security. Essentially, if fire walls and intrusion monitors can
successfully control the risk associated with vulnerable software then it
might not be efficient for producers to invest the resources needed to
reduce the amount of security holes.
There is also a second advantage to add-on security measures that
arguably makes them superior to both improved security through design
and patching. With the other forms of software security, the developer is
expending resources to fix holes in a piece of software that will be used by
a variety of different companies, some of which face very few security
threats, or do not have data that is deserving of substantial protection.
Certainly, Citibank needs a higher level of protection than a minor ecommerce web site, but both may employ the same basic database
software. With security-specific applications, Citibank can choose the level
of security that is appropriate to its risk level and the value of its
information. This is the flipside of the argument that it is more efficient to
fix the software once instead of companies individually investing in costly
security measures. It is not clear which of these two effects predominates,
but there is a separate reason to prefer that the software company act
instead of individuals choosing the security level they believe is
appropriate.
Unlike the world of physical security, insecure companies are a threat
to more than themselves. If an intruder can easily enter a company's
network, he or she can launch an attack on his or her real target using that
46. Mercuri, supra note 28, at 11.
47. See Martin Caminada et al., Internet Security Incidents: a Survey within Dutch
Organisations,17 COMPUTERS & SECURrrY 417 (1998); ScHNEIER, supra note 14, at 89 ("Today's
fire walls act as boundaries between private networks and the vast public network. They keep
intruders out, and only allow authorized users in"); Dunagan, supra note 43 (explaining that

technology is making it increasingly difficult to illegally access sensitive data).
48. See Schneier, supra note 10.
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company's computers, helping to cloak their identity from possible
identification. This type of obfuscation is a key problem for law
enforcement in their pursuit of computer criminals, and also complicates
the building of cases for prosecution. 49 Furthermore, access to an insecure
company's systems might help to compromise other, possibly more
important, companies with which they regularly share data. For example,
an intruder could use his presence within the first company to help slip past
the fire wall of the second company, or directly enter through a wide-open
connection between the two networks, like ajust-in-time ordering system.
Lastly, insecure networks are useful to malevolent intruders, because they
can be used for launching Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In these
attacks, computers brought under the attackers control are used to flood a
server with requests for service, which can effectively bring network traffic
to a stand-still." If enough computers are turned to this purpose, in what
are known as Distributed DoS attacks, even web sites with enormous
resources can be compromised." Consequently, even if defensive
countermeasures were extremely effective in countering attacks, there still
might be an efficiency problem in that individual users might not choose
an amount commensurate with the optimal social level.
These types of security technologies have their uses; however, in terms
of risk analysis overreliance can be dangerous. These countermeasures are
largely perimeter defenses; and as a result, once an intruder is able to
circumvent them there are few limitations on the amount of damage that
can be done. 2 This would not be a problem if the technology were perfect,
but this is far from the case, and the combination of human error and
system failure means that failures are inevitable.53 Another problem is that
these technologies cannot replace application security because
vulnerabilities at the application level can undercut their effectiveness.
49. See Bill Boni, Crossing the Line or Making the Case?, 2002 COMPUTER FRAUD &
SECURrrY 18, 19, (Dec. 2002) (explaining that difficulties in tracing hackers is a severe problem
for law enforcement).
50. See Skibell, supra note 12 (explaining the combination of how little computing skill is
needed to launch DoS attacks, and the potential damage that they can do, makes them one of the
most popular forms of computer crime).
51. The danger from distributed DoS attacks was made apparent in February 2000, when
several high-profile sites were effectively shutdown. See Skibell, supra note 12, at 351; Pinkney,
infra note 68, at 60.
52. See Avi Freedman, Securingthe Edge, QUEUE, Mar. 2003, at 6,8 ("Since any determined
attacker (an employee's teenager, for example) can probably find one user to 'come in as' through
sanctioned and supported VPN channels, it's also important to ensure authenticated users don't get
the keys to the kingdom when inside your network.").
53. See SCHNEIER, supranote 14, at 280-81 (noting the technological and human problems
with countermeasures).
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Because these countermeasures function according to a particular logic that
can be easily grasped by an external attacker, their weaknesses can be
targeted. This problem can be seen in the case of cryptography. Even
perfect cryptography will not protect against many different types of
attacks because the endpoints (where the information gets encrypted or
decrypted) can be attacked if those applications are insecure. Attackers
know this, and consequently the most vulnerable aspect of a given system
is generally application security.54
The other reason that application security can undermine defensive
measures is that to a large degree they are dependent on applications for
the logic under which they operate. This problem is particularly apparent
in the case of fire walls, which are often regarded as the most potent of
these types of defensive precautions. The term "fire wall" comes from the
iron walls that separated the passenger cars on coal-powered trains from
the engine compartment. The accumulation of highly flammable coal dust
would ignite fires, and the wall kept the fires from spreading. The image
conjured up by the term is one of complete protection, a hard shield that is
a perimeter around the network." However, a fire wall is permeable, and
acts as more of a gatekeeper. Thus, a cell wall would be more of an
accurate analogy.56 An attacker can sneak something through the fire wall,
and modem networks are susceptible because of the varying types of
information with which the fire wall must interact. 7 This is most
problematic in a business context, where information flows are constant
between the company and outside systems. For example, a just-in-time
ordering system has to maintain a constant and open connection between
the network and that of partner companies. Not only does this create an
inherent vulnerability because of the amount of information flowing, but
it also risks an insider attack from the partner company. The point is that
the effectiveness of fire walls is never going to be perfect, and to a large

54. See ViEGA & McGRAw, supra note 21, at 94.
55. Bruce Schneier makes an interesting observation on the etymology of the term. He
believes the reason that the term "fire wall" so poorly matches up with the technological reality is
that the meaning has changed since it was first used in computer networks. The original networks
were buggy and would inevitably crash, and fire walls were installed to prevent bad networking
software in one part of the network from taking down the rest of the network. SCHNEnER, supranote
14, at 88.
56. Bruce Schneier uses the analogy of the Great Wall of China to denote the permeability
of fire walls. See id. at 190.
57. See Levine, supra note 14, at I; see SCHNEIER, supra note 14, at 166 ("A firewall is a
router with a consistent rule set that it tests network traffic against... This was relatively easy in
early networks, but today's firewalls have to deal with multimedia traffic, downloadable programs,
Java applets, and all sorts of weird things.").
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degree their effectiveness is determined by how secure the underlying
applications are. On this point Matthew Levine notes:
By design, however, the network must route legitimate traffic to the
critical resources housing business logic in the form of applications.
Network security protects the integrity and reliability of the traffic to
critical resources, but application logic must determine what input or
transactions are legitimate. Manipulation and corruption of application
logic is an attacker's approach to compromising business data."
Superior algorithms may improve their ability to filter traffic, but
ultimately they are a simple gatekeeper dependent on interactions with
other programs for information on what to block. Consequently, fire walls,
and other types of perimeter defenses, are not suitable replacements for
secure software.
The final problem with defensive technologies concerns their visibility
and how they influence the perceptions of an attacker. This is not true of
every one of these measures, but in general one can easily locate, and even
check the brand of fire walls, intrusion-detectors, and virus detectors, prior
to commencing an attack. 9 In contrast, most applications are not visible
through the fire wall, and one aspect of designing security into the
application is constructing it to decrease its visibility.6" Fingerprinting is
the technique by which an intruder uses a port scanner in order to ascertain
the operating system and applications running on a system. It can be
difficult to do, is time-consuming, and opens up the intruder to the
possibility of detection.6 Consequently, when the applications are secure
an intruder may not know whether they can even break into a system until
they have assumed these types of costs, and the importance of raising the
transaction costs in this manner can be seen by drawing upon academic
work on the effectiveness of physical security.
This problem can best be understood by looking to a framework used
by Steven Shavell in analyzing the market for physical security products.
Shavell notes that there is a difference between observable security
58. Levine, supra note 14, at 1.
59. Schneier notes that a particular type of intrusion monitor does not have this problem,
called a burglar alarm or honey-pot. They function by attaching an alarm to a hidden spot within
the system, or to a dummy part of the system that has been made to purposefully look attractive to
an intruder. However, in general these technologies are visible. See SCHNEIER, supra note 14,
at 198.
60. ViEGA & MCGRAw, supra note 21, at 64.
61. See Fyodor, Remote OS Detection via TCP/1P Stack Fingerprinting(June 11, 2002),
availableat http://www.insecure.org/nmap/nmap-fingerprinting-article.htmi (last visited Oct. 29,
2003); Ronald Black, How Does Network Security Scanning Work Anyway? (Sept. 27, 2000),
availableat http://www.giac.org/practicalUGSEC/RonaldBlackGSEC.pdf (last visited Oct. 29,
2003).
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precautions and unobservable precautions in terms of their impact on
perpetrator behavior.62 Observable precautions have a displacement effect,
in the sense that iron bars on one's windows may encourage a burglar to
attack a more vulnerable house down the street. They may also have what
Shavell calls a theft reduction effect; in that they may decrease the amount
that a dedicated thief can successfully steal.63 Similarly, a computer
criminal that determines a company is using a technologically superior fire
wall or intrusion-monitor may simply move onto an easier target. Shavell
uses the example of wall safes to demonstrate that unobservable
precautions operate differently. A wall safe will have the same type of theft
reduction effect as observable precautions, but it will not possess a
diversionary aspect because the thief will not know if the house has a safe
or not. In this way unobservable precautions can produce a more general
deterrent effect; as the number of safes goes up, so does the thief's
perception that any individual house may contain one and the general cost
of engaging in criminal behavior is raised for the thief. This prediction has
been borne out in an impressive study by Ian Ayres and Steven Levitt on
the Lojack vehicle retrieval system. 4 Ayres and Levitt found that the
marginal social benefit of an additional unit of Lojack has been fifteen
times greater than the marginal social cost in high crime areas. 6' This
reduction in crime was largely due to the deterrent effect delineated by
Shavell, as they found that the perception of the mean Lojack installation
rate strongly influenced thief behavior.66 The same might be true of
software security: if the average amount of users of secure software were
increased and if the type of applications were successfully shielded from
external view, then crime might go down.6 7
There is another interesting aspect to this deterrence argument, in that
this transaction cost analysis could also be extended to the discovery of
62. Steven Shavell, IndividualPrecautionsto PreventTheft: PrivateVersus Socially Optimal
Behavior, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 123, 126(1991).
63. Id.
64. Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalitiesfrom Unobservable
Victim Precaution:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Lojack, Q.J. ECON., Feb. 1998, at 43, 44 ("in this
paper we provide the first thorough empirical examination of the externalities associated with selfprotective efforts").
65. See id. at 43.
66. See id. at 75-76 ("auto theft rates are affected by thieves' perceptions about the mean
Lojack installation rate").
67. Ayres and Levitt found that Lojack is so effective that penetration rates as low as 10-20%
might actually eradicate car theft altogether. See id. at 75. The combination of the impossibility of
determining whether Lojack is installed, and the high risk of Lojack leading to a criminal
prosecution, makes it somewhat unique. However, the example is still instructive of the potentially
powerful effects of raising the perception of the mean rate of unobservable security precautions.
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holes. Microsoft's Passport information system only took four minutes to
break, and the expectation of this type of quick result encourages attempts
to try and locate software holes. Consequently, a slight increase in the level
of software security might have a significant deterrent effect in that
computer criminals may not see it as worth their time to probe the code in
search of holes that might not be there. This is also an important reason
why the cost of increasing software security might not be as high as
commonly thought.

III.

TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR INSECURE SOFTWARE

That society is not utilizing the proper level of security in software
applications strongly suggests that the market for software products is not
properly functioning. A normal competitive market should move towards
an equilibrium point where the mix of the three components of computer
security should be at their optimal point; instead, the two other types are
being emphasized at the expense of application security. There are two
main explanations that serve as an excuse for poor quality software. The
first explanation focuses on the supply-side, and the possibility that
vendors are not being properly incentivized due to the absence of liability
for security holes. The second argues that the problem comes from the
demand-side, specifically, that business consumers are systematically
undervaluing the worth of secure software. Neither of these theories is
particularly compelling, as they struggle to explain on a causal level why
the market has not compensated. This market is composed of sophisticated
buyers and sellers, and only a structural impediment can adequately
explain why they have not adjusted and overcome minor hurdles to
efficient allocation of security resources.
A. The Failureof the Absence of Liability Theory
There are a number of impediments to attempting to sue manufacturers
for negligently producing software with security weaknesses. Most
software purchases are considered a sale of "goods," and are covered under
corresponding provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.6 8 Some courts
68. See Kevin R. Pinkney, Putting Blame Where Blame is Due: Software Manufacturer
Liabilityfor Security-Related Software Failure, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 43, 67 (2002); Daniel
T. Perlman, Note, Who Pays the Priceof ComputerSoftware Failure?,24 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 383, 385 (1998). The most forceful and influential statement of this doctrine comes in
Advent Systems v. Unisys Corp.:
The topic has stimulated academic commentary with the majority espousing the view that
software fits within the definition of a "good" in the U.C.C.... The importance of software
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have distinguished that the full development of software for a specific
company should be understood as a service, rather than a good.69 However,
this difference is relatively unimportant, as very few software applications
are built from the ground up for one purchaser. The importance of falling
under the UCC is that they are subject to its warranty provisions, which has
the effect of preempting negligence claims that might have been brought
under a tort theory of liability.7 ° Furthermore, in a contract for a sale of
goods the default remedy does not include consequential damages,
meaning that the majority of the loss will fall upon the purchaser.7
The other possible avenue for arguing for liability would be through the
civil liability section of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.72 Early cases
made it seem possible that a defective design that harmed the integrity of
one's system might be reachable under the statute. For example, in Shaw
v. Toshiba American Information Systems, Inc., the court held that
defective floppy disk controllers qualified as knowing transmission under
the statute, and thus the manufacturer could be liable for damages in excess
of $5,000. 7 3 However, two changes made to the CFAA by the USA Patriot
Act cut off use of the statute for these purposes. Congress altered 18
U.S.C. section 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) so that only the government could
aggregate losses from a related course of conduct to meet the monetary
liability threshold. 7' This makes it much harder to use the civil liability
to the commercial world and the advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the
U.C.C. are strong policy arguments favoring inclusion. The contrary arguments are not
persuasive, and we hold that software is a "good" within the definition in the Code.
Advent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675-76 (3d Cir. 1991).
69. See, e.g., Pearl Invs., L.L.C. v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326,353 (2003) ("By
contrast, in the instant case, Standard and Pearl agreed that Standard would create ATS software
from scratch (concept to realization) for which it would be paid on a time and materials basis.").
70. See Perlman, supra note 68, at 385 ("the UCC's warranties... pre-empt the possibility
of a negligence claim"); Alan Charles Raul et al., Liabilityfor Computer Glitches and Online
Security Lapses, BNA Electronic Commerce Law Report, Vol. 6, No. 31, at 849 (Aug. 8, 2001),
available at http://pubs.bna.com/nwsstnd/ip/BNA/EIP.NSF/23d9e82d7d25950885256743006e
3012/df54d7572ecfd Idb85256aa100762737?OpenDocument&Highlight-2,raul (last visited Oct.
29, 2003).
71. See Perlman, supra note 68, at 386.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i).
73. See Shaw v. Toshiba Sys., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Tex. 1999); see also In re AOL, Inc.
Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (AOL's transmission allegedly
"changes" the host system's communications configuration and settings is actionable); Christian
v. Sony Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (Dist. Ct. Minn. 2001) (providing diskettes with faulty
code "violates the CFAA").
74. See Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), Field Guidanceon New
Authorities That Relate to ComputerCrime and ElectronicEvidence Enacted in the USA Patriot
Act of 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/PatriotAct.htm (last visited
Sept. 22, 2003).
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subsection because a plaintiff would have to prove that a single attack
caused sufficient monetary damage to trigger liability, rather than being
able to add the damage from related attacks against the system.
Furthermore, Congress added language to the civil liability subsection that
specifically exempts damage from the negligent design of software or
hardware.75 This change almost certainly forecloses the possibility of using
the CFAA against software manufacturers.
Some have argued that this no liability regime is a fundamental reason
why software is insecure.76 Essentially, without this liability vendors lack
a key incentive to produce a quality product, as is effectively explained by
Bruce Schneier:
There is no market incentive to produce secure software because software
manufacturers risk nothing when their products are insecure. . . If
automobile manufacturers were immune from product liability, I would
be able to buy a motorcycle with a nitrous oxide injector spliced into my
fuel line. I would be able to push the acceleration faster than the brakes
could handle. I would be able to have any performance feature that the
manufacturers could build, regardless of the consequences. But I can't,
because the manufacturers would face lawsuits for marketing an unsafe
product.77
Schneier's analogy to car manufacturers is instructive because it
demonstrates that this argument is predicated on a certain interpretation of
the nature of software. He is comparing software to a mass-market product,
where the consumer is not in position to negotiate specific terms and does
not have the technical knowledge to assess the safety feature of the
product. While an argument can be made that this is the case for shrinkwrap software, it does not fit business application software that is the
primary focus of this Article. Manufacturers being free from liability is a
default rule that could be altered through the incorporation of different
contractual terms, and even small and medium-sized businesses negotiate
specific terms for enterprise applications.7" Software companies do not rely
on these default rules; instead they include specific contractual clauses to
free themselves from liability, as is noted by Daniel Perlman:
75. See CCIPS, Redline Version of USA PatriotAct, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/Patriotredline.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
76. See Pinkney, supra note 68, at 72 (the no liability regime encourages companies to not
exercise due care); SCHNEIER, supra note 14, at 365 ("Software manufacturers don't have to
produce a quality product because they face no consequences if they don't."); Ira Sager & Jay
Greene, The Best Way to Make Software Secure: Liability,BuslNEssWEEK, Mar. 18,2002, (arguing
that software is poor because there is no liability).
77. Schneier, supranote 4, at xx-xxi.
78. Correa, supra note 18 (explaining that there are opportunities to negotiate these terms).
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Contracts covering software agreements typically include standard form
exculpatory terms such as integration clauses, warranty disclaimers, and
provisions limiting remedies to the repair or replacement of defects. The
use of these contract provisions shifts the risk of software failure from the
seller to the user.79

These terms do not always have to be to the detriment of the buyer, as
there are some limited examples of larger companies successfully
negotiating the inclusion of clauses conferring liability on the
manufacturer.8 0 Basically, the fact that the default rules do not favor
consumers in disputes has very little to do with the contractual terms that
could be included in contracts.
With this having been said, there is the possibility that a structural
reason might be preventing different contractual terms from being
negotiated, with implications for the importance of the default rule on
influencing behavior. An organization's network will have applications
from a number of different vendors, and it is not clear how security
incidents resulting from application interaction would be handled. There
is also a moral hazard issue, as a large proportion of software incidents
result from the failure of internal IT staffs to properly configure software
or to install patches."' Estimating the damage from computer intrusions is
also notoriously difficult, and would have to be negotiated prior to signing
the contract.8 2 Yet while these problems exist for computer intrusion
insurance policies, they are becoming widely available. 3 While these
policies have only been offered for a limited period of time, and are still
being fine-tuned, insurers believe that a mix of deductibles, security audits,
and effective pricing can overcome the difficulties with assigning liability
in this context." This is solid evidence that vendors and purchasers could
79. Perlman, supra note 68, at 386. Correa, supra note 18; Suzanne R. Eschrich, Note, The
Year 2000- Delightor Disaster: Vendor Liabilityand the Year 2000 Bug in ComputerSoftware,
4 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 8 (1998) ("In negotiated contracts, the contract normally contains
provisions limiting or excluding warranties, and limiting liability").
80. See Dennis Fisher, ContractsGetting Tough on Security, EWEEK, Apr. 15,2002 (though
the contract referred therein did not include a consequential damages clause).
81. Miller, supra note 11 (arguing that configuration errors are the principle cause of
intrusions); Mark Rasch, Suing Over Slammer, SECuRrrY Focus, Feb. 10, 2003.
82. See Skibell, supra note 12 (explaining the many problems with common damage
determinations); Correa, supra note 18 (the BSA never quotes damage figures because they know
how unreliable they are).
83. Lawrence A. Gordon et al., A Framework for Using Insurance for Cyber-Risk
Management, 46 CoMM. ACM 82 (2003) (noting that American International Group, Chubb,
Fidelity & Deposit, Marsh, Lloyds of London, J.S. Wurlzer, and others provide cyber-insurance).
84. See id. at 82-84; Oscar Kolodzinski, Cyber-InsuranceIssues: Managing Risk by Tying
Network Security to Business Goals, CPA J., Nov. 1, 2002, LEXIS; Richard Thieme, What
InsuranceCan - and Can't - Dofor Security Risks, SECURE BUS. Q., Winter 2001, at 2-3.
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account for these issues in a properly negotiated contract. In fact, the
existence of cyber-insurance policies makes the fact that vendors do not
take on the burden of liability something of an anomaly. Because vendors,
rather than insurers, understand the risks associated with their products,
one would think this would put them in the best position to assume the risk
of intrusions, and profit, from risk-averse businesses. The same should be
true of moral hazard, in that the vendors should be able to better anticipate
the risks of configuration errors or failure to update software, and guard
against them. While alternative explanations exist for this phenomenon, the
fact that this is not occurring strongly points towards the existence of a
substantial market failure.
B. The Failureof the Lack of Demand Theory
Presumably, if there were a sufficient demand for secure products, then
market forces would compel vendors to create better software. Drawing
upon this logic, most attempts to explain why a computer security problem
exists have focused on the businesses' demand for security. Two related
versions of this approach exist, the first of which claims that executives
suffer from a technological myopia which prevents them from
understanding the value of safeguarding information. 85 It is not a market
failure in the sense that the information is not available; rather it is a
generation of executives that cannot appreciate the importance of
something as abstract as computer security. 6 Consequently, one would
predict that it would dissipate over time as management familiarized
themselves to a larger degree with technology, and as younger and more
technologically focused individuals infiltrated the higher ranks of
management. The available evidence indicates that just such a scenario is
being played out. The risk of computer intrusions has largely infiltrated the
corporate consciousness, and Mario Correa contends that the vast majority
of CEOs are generally aware of security as an issue, and appreciate its
importance for their businesses. 7 His contention is independently
supported by research surveys which demonstrate "a greater acceptance by
senior management that information needs to be protected." 8 Studies also
85. See, e.g., WINN SCHWARTAU, CYBER-SHOCK: SURVIVING HACKERS, PHREAKERS,
IDENTITY THIEVES, INTERNET TERRORISTS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 225 (2000)

(arguing that the principal problem is a lack of awareness of security issues).
86. Id.
87. Correa, supra note 18.
88. Stephen Hinde, Security Surveys Spring Crop,21 COMPUTERS & SECURITY, 314 (2002);
see also Richard Power, 2002 CSIIFBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, 8 COMPUTER
SECURITY ISSUES & TRENDS, 1 (2002).
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show that companies are increasingly placing high level administrators in
specific computer security positions, and that the majority of them report
directly to senior management.89 The growing role of a constituency within
corporations focused on computer security suggests that these types of
concerns are being seriously considered by corporate decision-makers.
And while it may have been true at one time that the problem of insecure
systems could be linked to corporate apathy, this no longer appears to be
the case.
The second version contends that because the value of security products
is probabilistic in comparison to the costs which are concrete and up-front,
businesses do not choose the proper level of security. 90 The implication is
that businesses will continue to under-invest in the efficient amount of
security on a societal level, because they choose less expensive options
when they are faced with the concrete costs of secure systems. An
illustrative example was the federal government's Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria, also referred to as the Orange Book Program,
which were a series of guidelines meant to influence commercial systems
development and thus improve security generally. Industry successfully
delivered secure products; however, governmental agencies refused to buy
them, instead preferring less expensive and more functional alternatives. 9'
Some basis for this problem also exists in cognitive theory, as individuals
are generally risk-averse when it comes to potential gains, but are risk
seekers when it comes to potential losses. It is well documented that there
is a substantial qualitative difference between the curve of subjective
utilities for gains and for losses. 92 However, if such a cognitive bias were
responsible for companies not valuing secure software, then one would
expect a similar pattern with regard to other types of IT security spending.
This does not seem to be occurring, as security applications and consulting
are the fastest growing subgroup within the technology sector.93 Dataquest,
89. Lorraine Cosgrove Ware, CIO Research Reports, Security Spending: How Much is
Enough?, CIO MAG., Sept. 12, 2002 (surveys demonstrate the increasingly important role played
by security personnel), availableat www.csoonline.comlcsoresearch/report6.html (last visited Nov.
18, 2003).
90. See, e.g., CTSB, supra note 27, at 7 ("[Security] has no value when there is no attack or
natural/accidental disruption in the system environment. Consequently, people tend to use as little
of it as they think they can get away with."); Miller, supra note 11.
91. See CTSB, supra note 27, at 9 (arguing that the Orange Book is a striking example of
how security is disfavored in buying decisions).
92. See MAssimo PIATELLI-PALmARNI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS: How MISTAKES OF REASON
RULE OUR MINDS 60-61 (1994).

93. Kelly Kavanagh, North America SecurityServices MarketForecast:200 1-2006, Gartner
Research Report (Oct. 9, 2002), available at http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?doc_
cd=! 10432 (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
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a Gartner analyst firm, forecasts that security-related services in North
America will grow to $9 billion by 2006, up from $4.1 billion in 2001, a
compound growth rate of 17%.94 To put these numbers in perspective,
Bruce Sterling found when researching his 1993 book that there was
virtually no private industry, the government and phone companies were
completely responsible for computer security.95 Security-specific spending
has continued even as the rest of the software industry suffers from the
global slowdown. For the third and fourth quarters of 2002 every software
sector was down, with the exception of the security sector which showed
12.8% and 11.1% growth respectively.9 6 Furthermore, companies are so
uncomfortable about bearing the risk of security incidents that they are
increasingly finding insurance to be an attractive option.97 Given the high
level of corporate resources being devoted to computer security, a lack of
will does not seem to be a compelling explanation for why companies are
not demanding more secure software applications. Also, considering the
evidence that application security is instrumental to preventing intrusions,
the lack of a demand for secure applications is a rather glaring anomaly,
and is worthy of further investigation.

IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR AN INFORMATION FAILURE THEORY

The reason that buyer demand does not equate to more secure
applications being supplied is that there are informational failures which
handicap the functioning of this market. For buyers to be able to
successfully make purchasing decisions that create pressures for improved
security, they have to be able to evaluate the quality of the product. The
higher the degree of buyer uncertainty is with regard to the security level
of a product, the less it should factor into the purchasing decision.
Companies may make claims with regard to security, but in practice these
assertions are often quite exaggerated and do not provide a sufficient basis
to make a concrete investment in more expensive software.9 8 Furthermore,
companies know how difficult it is to distinguish between products on the
basis of security, and thus find it more useful to try and compete on the
basis of functionality and price.
94. Id.
95. BRUCE STERLING, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE ELECTRONIC

FRONTIER 43 (1993).
96. Hugh Bishop & James Tsai, IT Spending Shows Mixed Results, Aberdeen Group
Research Report (Mar. 12, 2003) (on file with the author).
97. Gordon et al., supra note 83, at 82.
98. Schneier, supra note 10, (arguing that the security claims of companies are usually
nothing more than unverifiable advertising).
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This reluctance of purchasers to base their decisions on security may be
enhanced by the composition of the market, which is dominated by a few
major producers.99 Once a company makes the sizable investment to work
with one of these providers, substantial sunk costs may inhibit them from
changing. This behavior is a form of path dependency, where the switching
costs are so prohibitively high that a company may be forced to continue
working with the same provider even after it has become aware of the
substantial security failings of their software. This is particularly true in the
case of enterprise applications, since a corporation is unlikely to change
providers once it has invested in a total network solution, like that offered
by SAP. The market numbers provide an illustration of how pronounced
this path dependency problem is, as sales rates for enterprise applications
have been contracting since 2001, and Gartner is projecting a mere 3.1%
compound growth rate in the sector for 2002-2006. 0° This drop in demand
is forcing the major software vendors into the small and medium business
market, which traditionally has had a higher degree of competitiveness.' 0 '
This migration into the small and medium business market may be an
indication that the switching cost problem may also continue to grow.
A conceptual reason why security testing is so difficult is namely that
what one is trying to establish is the nonexistence of something. Security
testing can only verifiably establish the existence of holes, and not finding
a hole could be an indication of the quality of the investigation as much as
the quality of the product.0 2 However, what is not so apparent is just how
severe the implications are of this conceptual problem with security
testing. The effectiveness of an application resisting attacks is so opaque
that Schneier contends:
The average person cannot tell good security from bad security. It works
the same. It costs the same... The advertising is the same; the product
99. See Joanne Correia, Software Market Stalled in Global Economy's Slow Engine, Gartner
Research Report (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www4.gartner.com/pages/story.php.id.3350.
s.8.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) (explaining that the software titans continue to gain market share
over pure-play vendors, due to their ability to sell complementary services); see Judge Richard
Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, ALI-ABA Lecture (Jan. 29, 2001), available at
http://www.ali-aba.org/aliaba/posner_101 100.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) (explaining why the
software industry is particularly susceptible to anti-competitive behavior).
100. See Ronna Abramson, Big Software Aims Small in 2003, TheStreet.com, Dec. 30, 2002,
available at http://www.thestreet.com/tech/ronnaabramson/10057600.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2003).
101. See id. (relating that the market for small and medium business software has generally
been more competitive); James Browning, What SMBs and Their Vendors Should Be Thinking
About in 2003, Gartner Research Report (Nov. 11, 2002), availableat http://www3.gartner.com/
resources/ 11300/111302/11 1302.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
102. See ScHlNEIER, supra note 14, at 352 (detailing the conceptual problem of security
testing).
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literature is the same. It's not different until you look under the hood:

examine the source code, pick apart the hardware. And then only if you're
an expert. The average person still won't be able to tell a quality product
from snake oil. !°3
What Schneier means by "expert" is not a system administrator, or
someone else that has a background in programming. Rather, he means
someone that has a specific background in computer security, and is
familiar not only with the theory of how attacks are undertaken, but has
practical knowledge of how different components on the system's network
interact.'04 Only someone with this type of skill-set will be able to ascertain
if the absence of visible holes actually means that the holes are not there.
There are some additional complications that make security testing
difficult, even for someone with a deep knowledge of the field. Security
testing is different from functional testing in that it is a creative process,
whereby one probes the system to look for areas of potential weakness.'° 5
Consequently, familiarity with the product, and an understanding of how
it was developed and its internal structure, is fundamental to properly
testing it. A different impediment to effective purchaser testing is that the
source code is often hidden from the potential buyer. "° Security testing
generally does not result in clear-cut results, and usually a weakness is
only discovered when something about a system's behavior suggests a
need for manual inspection of the code.' 7 Without access to the code it is
nearly impossible to assess whether a vulnerability is present.'0 It is also
impossible to assess the general quality of the programming, or to evaluate
103. Id. at 392.
104. Not only does Schneier claim it takes a skilled professional, but he believes very

substantial amounts of man-hours are required for a comprehensive security evaluation. See id. at
350.
105. See VIEGA & McGRAw, supra note 21, at 39.
106. Just because the inaccessibility of the code makes security testing difficult, it does not
follow that opening the code would lead directly to more secure software, as has been alleged by
proponents of open-source software. See Moglen, supra note 38. There are a wide range of
incentive problems and technical limitations that suggest open-source software is no more secure
than proprietary software. See VIEGA & McGRAw, supra note 2 1, at 77-82.
107. See VIEGA & McGRAw, supra note 21, at 39.
108. John Dunagan described the difference between access and lack of access in a descriptive
analogy:
Just to make sure you understand the difference in how much less work there is to do when
you have access to the code, it's like having to verify that an ATM withdraw operation where
you request $x removes Sx from your bank account. If you don't have access to the source
code, you have to test every allowable input x and observe the effect. If you do have access
to the source code, you just check that the code takes an input and uses that same input to
debit your account
Dunagan, supra note 25.

THE PHENOMENON OF INSECURE SOFTWARE INA SECURITY-FOCUSED

WORLD

how an application deals with common security problem areas like access
control and end-to-end encryption."°9 In this sense, effective security
testing really is best done by the manufacturer, as they have a level of
access and depth of knowledge about the product which it is almost
impossible to replicate.
The inability of companies to verify an application's security
effectiveness does not necessarily mean that information on product
quality cannot be ascertained. To the extent that manufacturers and buyers
are repeat players, it is conceivable that reputation can serve as an effective
proxy, functionally serving the same purpose as testing. If a manufacturer
continues to not live up to the level of their security claims, the market
should respond by discounting their products accordingly. This works in
the case of most consumer products, as can be seen in the market for
automobiles. While the buyer may not be able to personally determine that
the Volvo is safer than the Toyota, the buyer factors the additional safety
of the Volvo into his buying calculation, based on its reputation. However,
this reputational mechanism is far from automatic and requires timely,
widely disseminated, and above all accurate information. Since costs are
associated with collecting and deciphering this information, if to a large
degree these criteria are not met then software buyers would have a
rational basis for not valuing security when buying software.
Even if a product is extremely vulnerable to attacks, this information
might not be effectively communicated. A number of companies search for
software vulnerabilities and publicly report them. The primary motivation
for these companies is to generate publicity for their security services, and
they have an economic incentive to issue a large amount of these alerts." 0
To garner as much exposure as possible, each alert emphasizes the severity
of the hole, and separating the important information from the trivial
becomes overwhelming."' They are also under the same constraints with
regard to the source code, and this limits the depth of analysis that they can
perform. The overall effect is a valueless amalgamation of security data
that a consumer cannot trust for buying decisions.
109. With access control one can generally check that it works part of the time, but not all of
the time without checking the source code. See id. Encryption is even more problematic in that all
types of cryptographic protocols are not equally secure in practice, even if they all use 128 bit keys.
For example, Microsoft developed its own proprietary protocol, Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol,
which was badly flawed. Since no one had access to the code, problems with the protocol were not
discovered until it had been widely used in Windows NT, 95, 98, and in their virtual private
network products. See SCHNEIER, supra note 14, at 117.
110. See Marcus Ranum, Script Kiddiez Suck- Toward an Economy for Vulnerability
Disclosure, 17 COMPUTER SECURlTY J. 28 (2001) (He quotes an estimate from Russ Cooper, the
moderator of NT Bugtraq, that 70% of these alerts are nothing more than marketing ploys.).
S11. See id. at 27 ("If there's too much information it becomes valueless.").
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More objective parties also face substantial obstacles in trying to collect
accurate information on the degree of security vulnerabilities found in a
company's software. As explained earlier, software manufacturers attempt
to contain all information relating to security weaknesses, on the basis that
its release serves as a blueprint for malevolent hackers ofhow to break into
systems. This will be particularly problematic if they are successful in
shutting down the largest source of reliable intrusion information, namely
governmental data under the Freedom of Information Act. Manufacturers
are lobbying for a broad FOIA exemption, and if they are successful, the
ability of researchers and other third parties to study software security
failures will be severely compromised.12
Given these difficulties, information about software vulnerabilities is
generally confined to what individuals or companies have learned through
personal experience. This information is not widely shared because
companies have little incentive to publicly report it, and the accompanying
information on how the intruder was able to penetrate their system. The
2002 Computer Security Institute/FBI survey found that only 34% of
respondents were willing to report intrusions to law enforcement."' The
respondents based this decision on fears about negative publicity, or that
competitors would use it to their advantage, both of which would be
present in a more widespread dissemination of attack data. 14 Thus, in a
drive to maintain an edge over their competitors, companies are cutting
themselves off from information that might be instrumental in helping
them to avoid similar attacks. The willingness of companies to share
information on computer intrusions may further deteriorate, as they begin
to fear that such disclosures could subject them to lawsuits. This concern
arises because under recent regulations, such as the finance industry's
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), and health care's Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), businesses could be liable for
inadequately protecting confidential customer information."'

112. Creatingthe Departmentof Homeland Security: Considerationof the Administration's
Proposal Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, 107th Cong. (July 9, 2002), (Testimony of David L. Sobel, General Counsel EPIC)
(explaining the importance of FOIA data on software failures), available at http://www.epic.org/
security/infowar/07 02 testimony.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
113. Power, supranote 88, at 10 (This percentage had been growing steadily over the survey's
six years, but seems to have stabilized at this level).
114. Id. at 21.
115. See Lawrence M. Welsh, Forecast:Cyberlitigation,INFO. SECURITY, Mar. 2003, at 24.
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WAY FORWARD

The failure of businesses to be able to distinguish between secure and
insecure products is at the heart of the current computer crime problem.
When consumers have no ability to evaluate a qualitative difference in an
aspect of a good, the only alternative is to make purchasing decisions on
other criteria. This is a rather simple proposition, but as has been
demonstrated, it can have a substantial impact on the efficient allocation
of market resources. The nature of this issue calls for a separate and
detailed examination in proposing a solution, but this Article's analysis
does demonstrate some areas of concern that should serve as a starting
point for such a study. In some ways the most obvious answer to this
problem would be to shift liability to software manufacturers for security
vulnerabilities in their applications. However, this would not address the
underlying problem and would most likely be bargained around, as has
occurred with the current default rule against liability. If liability were
more forcefully applied to manufacturers, the market would likely respond
by increasing security, but it is not clear that this would be done in an
efficient fashion. Depending on the liability rule, whether it be negligence
or strict liability, a rule that could not be bargained around might cut too
deeply and have a chilling effect on the production of software. 1 6 In this
sense, liability might not be a sufficiently tailored approach to correcting
this failure, and regulation might be superior as an alternative. However,
regulation would have to address the informational problem directly, so as
not to be as ineffective as the Orange Book program. This is not an easy
task, as the reasons for this failure are buried deeply into the structure of
the software relationship. Furthermore, the value from increased
information would in all probability not flow linearly, as there should be
a threshold of security knowledge before companies feel comfortable
spending more for secure software. Exactly how high this threshold is, and
how difficult it is to reach, should be at the center of any examination
advocating regulation as a solution.

116. Miller, supra note II (contending that any application of liability would have a
substantial chilling effect on the productivity of the industry).

134

JOURNAL OF 7ECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[Vol. 8

